Philosophers like Duhem and Cartwright have argued that there is a tension between laws' abilities to explain and to represent. Abstract laws exemplify the first quality, phenomenological laws the second. This view has both metaphysical and methodological aspects: the world is too complex to be represented by simple theories; supplementing simple theories to make them represent reality blocks their confirmation. We argue that both aspects are incompatible with recent developments in nonlinear dynamics. Confirmation procedures and modelling strategies in nonlinear dynamics show that there are simple, abstract theories that can be confirmed without encountering the problems pointed to by Cartwright.
Introduction
Common sense, although often invoked as the natural precursor of scientific realism, seems to suggest that there is a problem with representing the world in scientific theories: the world is complex, our best theories are simple-how can the two ever meet in the sense in which scientific realists claim they do? The laws of physics 'are too simple to represent reality completely', wrote Pierre Duhem and concluded that the 'struggle between reality and the laws of physics will go on indefinitely: to any law that physics formulates, reality will oppose sooner or later the harsh refutation of a fact...' (Duhem [1914] , pp. 176f.) But simplicity of the laws is one of their features which we value most; the laws' explanatory power seems to be closely related to their simplicity. Nancy Cartwright [1983] concluded from this inverse relation between simplicity (or ability to explain) and truth (or ability to represent) that the laws of physics cannot be meant to represent the facts; the laws' function, she suggested, must be to classify the facts conveniently, not to represent the way the world is.
There is, then, a methodological claim about the dissociation of explanatory power and truth, accompanied by a metaphysical picture about a world too complex to be adequately represented by simple theories. Scientific realists have responded by emphasizing the approximative character of theories: we can judge the approximate correctness of a theory by studying whether or not improved 'input' (more realistic initial and boundary conditions ...) leads to improved 'output' (more accurate predictions). (See e.g. McMullin [1985] ; Laymon [1989] .)
This realist response addresses the methodological claim, not the metaphysical-at least not directly. Furthermore, Cartwright has recently argued that it is a mistake to conceive the issue in terms of approximation to a true representation of nature. The fundamental laws, she suggests ([1989] , Ch.5), are 'abstract' claims, that is, claims which ignore or subtract most features of real systems. It presumably makes no sense to say that such claims approximate descriptions of features of real systems which the abstract claims do not even talk about.
The theories of nonlinear dynamics (NLD) appear to generate a peculiar additional problem for the realist response: in dealing with chaotic systems improved input for the theory will in general not lead to better predictions about the features relevant for confirmation, i.e. the long-term behaviour of the systems. We want to show, however, that NLD in fact provides a new response to the methodological claim above: the theories of NLD are 'abstract' and explanatory (in a sense to be specified) and, at the same time, they can receive empirical confirmation in a way that makes them candidates for true theories in Cartwright's sense; the arguments she levels against the possibility of confirming abstract explanatory laws do not hold in the case of the theories we consider. These theories, then, also provide counterexamples to the metaphysical claim: we have examples of systems that show extremely complex behaviour while the theories describing these systems are very simple; NLD explains how this is possible without having to compromise on the issue of confirming the theories. This is, of course, a quite limited" response because it is confined to the field of NLD. The significance of NLD as a case study, however, lies in the fact that, contrary to quantum mechanics or general relativity, NLD is presumably just a part of classical mechanics. And classical mechanics has been used, from Duhem to Cartwright, as a test ground for many of the arguments against the truth oflaws of physics. It should also be noted that, if we aim at accurate representations in physics, most real systems are to be described as nonlinear systems.
Confirmability and explanatory power
Why is there a tension between the explanatory power of a theory and its ability to be a true account of the facts? Cartwright has argued that what can be confirmed through tests and comparisons with observations are phenomenological laws-comparatively detailed descriptions of concrete situations which, because of their richness in detail, do not have great generality (sometimes called 'low-level generalizations'). If these phenomenological laws could be soundly derived from more fundamental laws, as the traditional view would have it, then any successful comparison of the phenomenological consequences of the theory with the observations would count unproblematically as inductive support for the theory. Confirmation would flow upwards from the phenomenological level to the fundamental level. This flow, however, is staunched, as Cartwright shows in detail, because phenomenological claims typically cannot be soundly deduced from more fundamental theories. To derive the former we usually need assumptions which are either false (distorted representations of the situation of application) or which contradict the fundamental laws themselves. Inductive support cannot, therefore, be transmitted. We call this the 'unsoundness argument'.
Why are the distortions and false assumptions in the derivation of phenomenological laws typical or even necessary for scientific practice? The fundamental laws are useful without being true descriptions: they 'explain' diverse phenomena, which for Cartwright, like Duhem, means, they 'organize and classify our knowledge in an elegant and efficient manner' ([1983] , p. 100). Simplicity thus becomes an ingredient in the explanatory power of a fundamental theory. A theory is highly explanatory if a small number of assumptions can be used to calculate certain quantities in a large number of different situations; the theory allows us to classify all these different situations as similar. Being explanatory in this sense, that is, being useful in many different contexts, requires the theory to neglect the specific differences between the contexts. (The theory 'abstracts' from these factors, as Cartwright says in [1989] , Ch.5.) Therefore, the theory cannot be true of any one of these real situations; it can give a correct description only of the behaviour of objects in highly idealized contexts or models. The model contains the distortions and idealizations that are necessary to make a theory bear on a real situation. Real objects and their behaviour are too varied, too complex, too messy to be treated faithfully by theories of great generality; that's why we need models to mediate between theory and phenomena (cf. e.g. [1983] , pp. 141 f., 150).
It is clear that this distorting character of models is the source of the unsoundness argument. The interference of the model between the 'abstract' theory and the phenomena blocks the back-flow of inductive support from the phenomenological laws to the fundamental theory. At the same time, however, Cartwright argues that models are necessary; they mediate between the abstract explanatory theory and the concrete descriptive claims about real situations: 'To explain a phenomenon is to find a model that fits it into the basic framework of the theory and that thus allows us to derive analogues for the messy and complicated phenomenological laws which are true of it' ([1983] , p. 152).
There is thus a trade-off between a theory's explanatory power and its (potential) truth: the more efficient a theory is in explaining or organizing a large variety of different phenomena, the less can it be true or state the facts. This trade-off is connected to the metaphysical picture of a complex world. Because the complexity of the behaviour of real objects is produced by the interaction of hopelessly many (causal) factors, varying from context to context, a simple, highly explanatory theory which inevitably ignores most of these factors has (almost a priori) no chance of ever providing a true description of a situation. Given this metaphysical intuition, Cartwright thinks that the realist's belief in the truth of fundamental laws can be plausible only against an additional metaphysical assumption, namely, that God created the world equipped with and governed by a few simple laws-for an empiricist a truly unnatural assumption (cf. [1983], pp. 101f.; [1993a] , p. 292).
Phenomenological and other theories
What Cartwright calls phenomenological laws are better adapted to the complexity of real situations than the fundamental theories. This adaptation, however, has as its price a decrease in simplicity, and hence explanatory power, of the laws. Phenomenological laws 'describe', they do not explain. The laws become context-specific and cease to be useful across many different situations; phenomenological laws are 'the complicated, messy laws which describe reality' ([1983] , p. 129). They describe regular behaviour in the phenomena and thus fulfil a traditional function of laws of nature, viz. to issue in, or correspond to, empirical regularities. The fundamental laws, however, cannot issue in such regularities-again, because these laws are typically much too simple and general to account for the actually observed variety of behaviours: 'If we want regular behaviour, the description of the circumstances must grow more and more complicated, the laws have less and less generality, and our statements of them will never be without exceptions. Fundamental laws, by contrast, are simple, general, and without exception'-which prevents them from being true of the phenomena ([1983] , p. 157).
What is it about phenomenological laws that enables them to be true? What is it about fundamental theories that prevents them from being true? Consider two examples.
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one of Maxwell's equations, is a fundamental law, relating the electric displacement in a dielectric medium to its source, the charge density p.
Fick's law of diffusion, is a phenomenological law, relating the flow J of a substance to the gradient of its density c. This law comes with ceteris paribus clauses (only the concentration gradient is operative, the system is isothermal, etc.), expressing the context-dependent character of the law (Cartwright [1983] , pp. 63f.). Why can (2) be a true description but (1) cannot? Three candidates for an answer are: (i) (2) mentions only 'observable' quantities, while (1) contains 'theoretical' quantities; (ii) (2) mentions more features (not necessarily observable) of concrete physical systems than (1); (iii) (2) can be applied without the mediation of a model while (1) needs a model. Answer (i) is clearly ruled out by Cartwright who wants to follow the usage of the term in physics (e.g. [1983] , pp. 2ff): 'phenomenological', as used by physicists, does not refer to 'observable' as opposed to 'unobservable'. Answer (ii) finds support in many places but it needs to be understood with some caution.
1 It means that phenomenological theories, as opposed to fundamental theories, are adapted to contexts in the sense that the specificity of the contexts is expressed in ceteris paribus clauses; this makes these theories complicated. But there are obviously limits to the context adaptation of theories, even though Cartwright does not emphasize these. In the absense of constraints such as might be imposed by a fundamental theory, phenomenological theories can become so flexible that they describe idiosyncrasies of a particular context instead of the 'intrinsic behaviour' of the system. 2 In the extreme case, such theories could describe the 'noise' present in the system instead of the 'signal' which would mean that the theory could not be applied to two different realizations of the same system. Clearly, on the one hand, this extreme ' It can't mean that phenomenological theories are completely faithful representations of a system; they inevitably contain many abstractions and idealizations. The ideal gas law, for instance, is clearly phenomenological, but Duhem ([1914] , p. 166) famously used it to illustrate the 'symbolic' character of all physical theories, that is, they are inevitably abstract and distortive representations of physical systems. 2 Cartwright doesn't seem to see this danger. 'If we aim for descriptive adequacy,' she says, 'and do not care about the tidy organization of phenomena, we can write better phenomenological laws than those that a [fundamental] theory can produce' ([1983] , p. 160). One could get such 'better laws', for instance, by fitting an equation with a large number of parameters to the data; the more parameters to be fitted, the more accurate the 'law'. implication has to be avoided in spelling out the notion of context adaptation. On the other hand, trying to capture in a theory the 'intrinsic behaviour' of a system tends to produce context-independent, i.e. fundamental, theories which do not fit the data any more. Answer (iii) appears to be the most plausible candidate. Phenomenological theories can be compared to the data in ways that avoid the unsoundness argument; therefore, agreement with the data will count as inductive support of the theories. What can be avoided in this case is the interference of models-a phenomenological theory does not need a model before the theory can be applied to a real situation. The distorting representation of the situation in a model is thus avoided and confirmation can flow back from successful predictions to the theory. In the example above: to apply Maxwell's equation (1) to calculate the electric field E in a dielectric medium we need a model of the medium which specifies how D relates to E. For many media we use a linear relation, D = eE, but this is not a generally valid description and often only approximately correct. To apply Fick's law (2) presumably all we do is make sure the ceteris paribus conditions are satisfied and then measure concentration differences to calculate J (assuming that we know the diffusion coefficient D). In this sense the connection between phenomenological laws and reality is modelindependent. For fundamental laws, by contrast, the connection is modeldependent; fundamental laws therefore cannot be confirmed, they are not candidates for true claims.
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In summary: The differences between phenomenological and nonphenomenological theories (leaving open for now whether the latter should be called 'fundamental' theories) are twofold:
(i) non-phenomenological theories are abstract-they abstract from the complexity of real situations to display the behaviour of one, or a few, One might wonder about the adequacy of such a view of the testing of phenomenological theories. Is it really plausible to suppose that no distorting constructs like models mediate the comparison of a phenomenological law with reality? Cartwright analyses the preparation of a description of a phenomenon as 'the first stage of theory entry ... we present the phenomenon in a way that will bring it into the theory. The most apparent need is to write down a description to which the theory matches an equation ' ([ 1983] , p. 133). And when 'we present a model of a phenomenon, we prepare the description of the phenomenon in just the right way to make a law apply to it ' (p. 157) . But this analysis obviously holds for the descriptions needed for testing phenomenological theories as well as for those descriptions that are being compared to models of fundamental theories, even though the extent and character of the theories' requirements will vary in both cases. In the terms of Bogen's and Woodward's study [1988] : what is immediately observed, the data, is not evidence for theories because such data typically cannot be accounted for by the theories; data are too fickle and context-dependent. Facts about phenomena, which are context-independent and stable, are evidence for theories, and data serve as the evidential basis for claims about phenomena. It seems obvious that phenomenological laws like Fick's law of diffusion are not about the data but about phenomena. factors all by themselves; in order to make contact with reality again these theories need the mediation of models; 4 (ii) they are explanatory in the sense that they, through their wide applicability, enable us to classify phenomena.
We will argue that theories in NLD can be phenomenological on the one hand (their application to real systems is model-independent) and abstract and explanatory on the other. Thus these abstract, explanatory theories are candidates for true claims about nature.
Simple theories of messy systems
Nonlinear dynamics is supposed to deal with certain systems that exhibit extremely complicated behaviour, behaviour so messy indeed that it appears completely random. On Cartwright's view we would expect theories which apply to such systems to be either (i) simple and explanatory (in the sense of classificatory with wide scope) but not confirmable, or (ii) complicated and descriptive (phenomenological, with narrow scope) but confirmable. This section and the next will argue that, and why, NLD theories do not fall into either of these alternative categories and that these theories, therefore, provide a counterexample to the methodological and metaphysical claims of Section 1.
It has been one of the most surprising insights of NLD that the complexity of the behaviour of nonlinear systems is often not produced by lots of factors operating together in unsurveyable ways-and therefore lying outside the scope of any simple theory describing the systems. Rather, the irregular behaviour is due to a very few factors which can be described by quite simple-looking theories. (One of the classic papers in the field is entitled 'Simple Mathematical Models With Very Complicated Dynamics'; May [1976] .)
To bring out the difference between the kind of theories in NLD and the strategy of accounting for complicated behaviour in traditional physics which Cartwright relies on, consider her example of an amplifier ([1983] , pp. 107-12). The abstract or fundamental theory used to model the amplifier leads to a formula which does not correctly describe the total resistance in the amplifier. To improve on the description, we introduce an additional resistance term into the equation, determined from observation, which takes care of the discrepancy between prediction and data. The rationale behind this strategy is that the additional term embodies the contribution to the resistance of factors that the theory ignored. The new term complicates the 'simple' formula which results from the theory.
Cartwright remarks that had all the factors that contribute been included at the level of the abstract theory, the simplicity characteristic of such theories would have been lost. Another illustration of the same strategy is the introduction of 'noise' terms into theoretical accounts to represent 'external' influences, not treated by the theory and regarded as effectively random.
The general strategy in these cases is this: we divide the behaviour of the system under consideration into two parts, that of the 'real system' or the intrinsic part, which is nicely or regularly behaved, and that of an 'environment' or extrinsic part which is responsible for deviations from the regular behaviour. The simple theory describes only the intrinsic part and in general will not be true of the system's observed behaviour (which is the superposition of intrinsic and extrinsic factors).
In NLD, by contrast, the irregularity of the behaviour is not necessarily blamed on an 'environment', disturbing an intrinsically regular-behaved system, but can often be modelled as an intrinsic feature of the system. The messy data from nonlinear systems are treated, at least in part, as the effect of simple dynamical laws without reference to external interfering factors. This is illustrated in an experiment of F. Moon and P. Holmes: one end of a steel beam is allowed to oscillate between two permanent magnets; the other end is externally driven sinusoidally with time. Under certain conditions, the tip of the beam oscillates between the magnets in a very irregular, 'chaotic' manner. This complex behaviour of a seemingly simple mechanism could conceivably be attributed to factors like noise in the shaking device (the driving force is not exactly sinusoidal), or irregular details of the microscopic structure of the beam-details which a simple theory of the system would neglect but which would have to be considered for an accurate reproduction of the observed behaviour. Moon and Holmes, however, showed that a simple second-order differential equation, involving only elastic, magnetic, frictional forces and the driving force, is able to account for the irregular behaviour of the beam. 'Thus, it is unnecessary to invoke complicated physical processes to explain the observed complicated motion' (Ott [1993] , p. 3).
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Similar stories have been told about a plethora of systems, ranging from chemical reactions to the human heart and fluctuations in economic systems. What is common to these applications of NLD is the attempt to account for complexity of behaviour in terms of simple theories, that is, 5 Another illustration is the theory about the onset of turbulence in liquids by Takens and
Ruelle as compared with the Landau theory: according to Landau, turbulence should occur through a sequence of infinitely many bifurcations leading to the excitation of infinitely many modes of oscillation. According to the Takens-Ruelle scenario, chaotic behaviour will set in after only three bifurcations. (Sec e.g. Berge, Pomeau, and Vidal [1986], pp.l03f.,161ff.) theories that portray a few factors which are able to generate the observed complexity without reference to interference from extrinsic factors or noise. Thus, for example, in traditional economic modelling 'the presence of a stationary pattern of fluctuations is ... attributed to the existence of exogenous shocks of one kind or another-most often either technology or taste shocks, or stochastic shifts in government policies'. Recent work, based on nonlinear modelling, however has revived the 'hypothesis that aggregate fluctuations ... might have an endogenous character that would persist even in the absence of stochastic "shocks" to the economy' (Boldrin [1992] , p. 188; emphasis added).
The difference between the 'traditional' modelling approach and the NLD approach can be seen to be relevant to the way Cartwright characterizes the methodology of (experimental) physics in her book on capacities ([1989] , Chs. 4, 5; cf. also [1993] ). Confronted with the irregularity of observed behaviour of systems, the lack of 'natural' regularities, we separate out, from the observed behaviour, the factors which would, all by themselves, isolated from the actual mixture of factors in the real system, show regular, nice behaviour. What we gain are simple laws about those factors which hold counterfactually, not, however, actually. This is the analytic or, in the term of Galileo's time, 'resolutive' part of the method. We then, in the synthetic or 'compositive' part, recover the observed irregular behaviour by superimposing different factors which were left out in the process of arriving at the simple laws (cf. e.g. McMullin [1985] ). It is obvious how this method leads to the gap Cartwright emphasizes between the simple laws, issuing in regularities, and the actually observed, irregular behaviour of natural systems: the simple laws must be about the behaviour of isolated individual factors; they are 'abstract' claims and they are 'tendency laws', as Cartwright calls them ([1989] , pp. 226ff.). These laws do not describe what happens in real situations which are a mixture of many factors. The simplicity characteristic of laws arrived at through the Galilean method is a residual property, the result of cleaning out 'disturbances'.
In NLD, by contrast, observed irregularity does not prompt us to search for a combination of regular-behaved factors and disturbances. Laws in NLD are not expected to issue in regularities (cf. Holt andHolt [1993] for different senses of 'regularity'). Thus, these laws do not have to be laws about the behaviour of isolated factors or tendencies. It becomes possible, as we will see in more detail below (Section 5), to model the behaviour of a system without resolving it into simple components. The irregular behaviour as a whole can be taken as the 'signal' which a simple theory has to account for. The surprising simplicity of the theories is thus not a residual property, acquired through the Galilean method, but a feature of the systems' dynamics. The dynamics of many dissipative nonlinear systems is such that, even though the system has many degrees of freedom and therefore should be described in a high-dimensional phase space, in the long run the phase space trajectories settle down on an 'attractor', that is, a low-dimensional surface in the full phase space. This reduces, often drastically, the number of degrees of freedom that are effective in the dynamics which generates the observed behaviour-a simple description, involving only a few factors, becomes possible.
Consider the phase space trajectories of a dissipative system lhat is forced externally, e.g. a driven damped pendulum. When the forcing-todissipation ratio is small enough, the system will behave regularly in the long run: trajectories evolving from any initial conditions will move to, or settle down on to, an attracting set of points that has a simple geometric shape, such as a point, circle or torus. The dimension of these geometric figures is smaller than the dimension of the full phase space of the dynamics because dissipation means that, in the course of the evolution, phase space regions filled with trajectories contract. When the forcing-to-dissipation ratio increases, the system's behaviour becomes unstable or irregular; the trajectories are now attracted towards a set which is 'strange': its dimension, still smaller than the dimension of the phase space, is now non-integer or 'fractal'. (The precise formulation of this phenomenon is given in the Center Manifold Theorem; cf. e.g. Gershenfeld [1988] , pp. 376ff.) Trajectories moving on such a strange attractor show the sensitive dependence on initial conditions characteristic of chaotic systems: two trajectories can start out very close to each other and move to totally different regions of the phase space.
Thus the dynamics of a system requiring a high-dimensional phase space can be reduced, in the long run, to the dynamics on a low-dimensional 'surface' within that space. The dimensionality of the attractor is less than the number of quantities that were necessary to describe the system initially, i.e. the number of its degrees of freedom. The simplicity of many NLD theories therefore is not due to the Galilean 'resolutive method' of isolating one factor from all the others in a system. Simplicity in NLD stems from a feature, in the long run, of the system's dynamics itself. Metaphorically: the theory attributes simplicity to a conspiracy of nature which thereby relieves us of doing the work of abstracting from the unmanageable complexity of the world.
Confirmation in nonlinear dynamics
Sensitive dependence on initial conditions in NLD systems requires us to modify the notion of a comparison of data obtained from a system with predictions from the theory. What does it mean, for instance in the steel beam example above, that the description of the beam's motion provided by the simple equation of Moon and Holmes is correct? Solving the equation does not result in a series of values that agrees point by point with the observed series of values. Calculated and observed data differ quantitatively but show qualitative agreement. In general it would seem suspect to be satisfied with quantitatively poor agreement. But nonlinear theory itself shows that 'point by point testing' is inadequate if the theory of the system is right (the term is Kellert, Stone, and Fine's [1990] ). If we test the theory in this way we will not find a precise quantitative fit, and this is to be expected if the theory is true of the system. Because of extreme sensitivity to initial conditions in chaotic regimes, no individual trajectory 'can be compared with experiment or with a computed orbit, since any orbit is effectively uncorrelated with any other orbit, and numerical roundoff or experimental precision will make every orbit distinct' (Abarbanel et al. [1993] , p. 1334).
The theory, if it were true, would never produce a point-by-point fit with the data. Notice that ceteris paribus clauses, which have been invoked traditionally to save theories from refutation in point by point testing, would not be of much help here because the lack of fit with the data is not due to interference of causal factors outside the scope of the theory. Even if the world were exactly the way the theory describes it, that is, the world did not contain any more factors than the theory mentions, we would not get good point-by-point fit. Compare this to Cartwright's view. She holds that if the world were exactly as the (fundamental) laws describe it we should get good fit. As a matter of experimental fact, we do not find good fit without tinkering with the laws, invoking ceteris paribus clauses, etc. Therefore, the world is not as the laws describe it; it is too complex for simple laws to portray it correctly. In the case of NLD theories, however, there clearly is no inference from the lack of quantitative fit between predictions and data to the falsity of the theories.
As much as this may sound like good news to the realist, there is an obvious problem here with respect to arguing for the approximate truth of NLD theories. A very plausible realist response to the claim that confirmation cannot flow back from successful predictions to theories because of the false assumptions involved in the derivation of the predictions has been to emphasize the improvability of predictions, given better assumptions. As Laymon put it, 'sets of fundamental laws [can] be monotonic toward the truth in the sense that more accurate and less idealized initial condition descriptions lead to more accurate predictions'. This strategy allows 'fundamental law candidates ... [to] be confirmed (or disconfirmed) even in the face of the use of distorting approximations and idealizations' (Laymon [1989] , p. 360). But, for the reasons outlined above, predictions from NLD theories often cannot be improved by feeding in more accurate descriptions of the system under study. At least if we concentrate-as explained below-on the comparison of features of calculated attractors and those of attractors extracted from the data, that is, features of the system 'in the long run', a more realistic description of the system may make no difference whatsoever to the features of the calculated attractor (cf. Morton [1993] , pp. 670f.). It seems that the realist cannot argue in Laymon's way for the approximate truth of NLD theories.
How do we then compare NLD theories with data? What has to be compared are the stable features of the dynamics of a system and the corresponding features of the theoretical dynamics, features that do not sensitively depend on initial conditions or small perturbations of the system. It is this way of comparing evidence and theory which is unique to NLD and which will provide a case against Cartwright's unsoundness argument.
Given a hypothetical description of the dynamics of the system we determine, often through numerical simulation, certain quantities associated with the system's (hypothetical) phase space: the Lyapunov exponents of its trajectories (a measure of how sensitively dependent the system is on initial conditions), the dimension of its attractor, and certain topological features of the ways in which the trajectories are entangled with each other. These metric and topological properties of the system are invariant under changes of initial conditions and under small perturbations of the system. Most importantly, they are invariant with respect to different ways of setting up the phase space: Whatever set of independent variables we use to span the phase space, that is, whatever coordinate system we choose to picture the dynamics of the system, the above features will stay qualitatively the same and thus provide a reliable characterization of the system's dynamics.
These metric or topological invariants of the hypothetical dynamics then have to be compared with the corresponding quantities extracted from the observed data from the system. The data are typically a 'time series', i.e. values of one observable measured at intervals of time. From this time series we reconstruct, without using any hypothetical model of the dynamics, that part of the system's phase space in which its attractor lives. Measuring this reconstructed attractor's metric or topological features then enables us to compare the hypothetical dynamics of the system with the 'real' dynamics. The test of a proposed theory of the system is positive in case there is compatibility between the reconstructed and the corresponding theoretical quantities (reviews of this way of testing: Abarbanel et al. [1993] ; Gershenfeld [1988] ; Popoff et al. [1992] (topological example); Tsonis [1992] , Ch. 8).
Consider as an example of the comparison procedure the description of a chemical reaction the Belousov-Zhabotinsky (BZ) reaction. Four reactants, malonic acid, potassium bromate, cerium sulfate, and sulfuric acid, are continuously pumped at a constant rate into a well-stirred tank; the concentration of one of the reaction products, e.g. the bromide ion Br~, is measured as a function of time. This time series can show periodic or chaotic behaviour. In the experiment of Simonyi el al. [1982] , for instance, the phase space fragment containing the system's attractor was reconstructed from the time series using 'delay coordinates'. The procedure, if successful, manages to reproduce the dynamics of a system with many degrees of freedom (many variables; from a single degree of freedom, that is, the measured values of a single van \ble (concentration of Br~). The idea underlying this method is that even though a single degree of freedom does not give a full picture of the actual complicated dynamics, the time evolution of this single variable is affected by the other degrees of freedom and thus contains information about the whole dynamical process. How can the information be retrieved?
Assume that the true unknown dynamics of the system is given by dx(t)/ dt = F(x(t)), with x being the d-dimensional state vector. We measure an observable g of the system at regular intervals t, t -w, t -2w,..., t -mw, thus obtaining a time series. The observable g is an unknown scalar function of the state vector:
Now define a 'delay coordinate vector' Y(t) with m components such that y (1) (t) = g(t), y (2) (t) = g(t-w), . . . , y (m) (t) = g[t -(m -l)w]. Since the system is assumed to be deterministic, any state x(t -nw) is uniquely determined by any x(t):
where L is an unknown function of x and n. Hence, any measured value g(t-nw) is a function of the state vector at t:
Y(t) can therefore be regarded as a function of the state x(t):
It can be shown that under quite general constraints on the dynamics, H will be a smooth function, that is, the geometric features of the time development of Y in the m-dimensional Y-space will be similar to the corresponding features of the true dynamics in the d-dimensional xspace. If m > 2d -f-1, H is guaranteed to be an 'embedding' of x-space into Y-space; the reconstructed vector Y can be taken as an image of the unknown state vector x (cf. e.g. Ott [1993], pp. 19-21, 93-7) . Thus the trajectory described by the vector constructed from the timedelayed values of the Br"-concentration, is an 'image' of the actual trajectory of the system, containing all the other reactants and products, in its full phase space. This means that if the experiment was able [which it is not] to simultaneously measure all the [concentrations of the] chemicals that are relevant to the reaction, a plot of the data would differ from the one generated by the trajectory of [Y(t)] only by a smooth change of coordinates . . . qualitative and quantitative measures of how [the trajectories] 'look' will be unchanged (Gershenfeld [1988] , p. 317).
6 Simonyi et al. [1982] plotted the Br"-concentration B(t + w) versus B(t) with a delay of w = 53 seconds which reveals a two-dimensional perspective on to a three-dimensional attractor (Figure la) .
Plotting the value of B(t n ) = x n at successive crossings of the dashed line in Figure la against x n+1 gives the graph of a smooth one-dimensional map ('first return map', Figure lb) , a map similar to the famous logistic map: x n+1 = r x n (l -x n ) (see Gyorgyi and Field [1993] for a review of suggested maps for the BZ reaction). Since there are more than twenty chemical species present in the tank, not just the few chemicals supplied externally, there is prima facie no reason to expect a low-dimensional behaviour at all. The significance of this result is that the long-term 6 Successful application of the method depends on clever choice of the delay w as well as on having sufficient data. For example, since 1984 there have been claims that a low-dimensional attractor has been reconstructed from times series of climate data (Nicolis and Nicolis [1984] ); more recent studies, however, have questioned whether the data base for these claims is sufficient (cf. e.g. Lorenz [ 1991 ] ). For detailed discussions of these constraints and limitations of the technique, cf. Ruelle [1990] ; Tsonis [1992] , Ch.9; Abarbanel et al. [1993] .
dynamics of the complex BZ system of reactants can be characterized by a one-dimensional dynamics without loss of empirical adequacy.
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Notice that in the reconstruction procedure the only assumption we have to make about the system is that it evolves according to dx(t)/dt = F(x(t)). This assumption should not be called a model in any interesting sense; indeed, we do not need a detailed model of the system at all. Thus, the application of the one-dimensional map to the BZ reaction (the comparison of theory and phenomena) is possible without the invocation of models that would mediate between the theory and the phenomena.
Explanatory power in nonlinear dynamics
The way in which NLD theories are compared with the data has several consequences for the issues we are concerned with, (i) Recall that we identified as the most plausible reason for Cartwright's claim that explanatory theories cannot be confirmed (and that phenomenological theories can) the fact that, in any comparison of an explanatory theory with the evidence, models have to mediate or make the abstract theoretical claims bear on the concrete system under investigation. Models, as Cartwright shows, distort reality and cannot be regarded as faithful representations. The unsoundness argument then concludes that abstract theories cannot receive confirmation from successful predictions that are based on models of the theories.
In the NLD comparison procedure outlined above, we compare data with theories in a model-independent way: if we compare attractors calculated from a theory with the corresponding features reconstructed from a time series we are not inserting a model between the theory and the data. Attractors, their dimensions, Lyapunov exponents, etc., the dynamical invariants of the system, are all model-independent features of the dynamics:
Dynamical systems theory provides a language for properly posing ... questions [like] : What is the dimension of the dynamics? How chaotic is the dynamics, or in other words, what is ... the largest Lyapunov exponent? It thus gives us a model-independent language for posing the problems of systems characterization (Eubank and Farmer [1990] , p. 171).
(ii) NLD theories thus have something in common with 'phenomenological' theories in the sense of being model-independent. The interesting thing, however, is that, even though these theories can be confirmed or disconfirmed, they are not phenomenological in the sense of being contextadapted; NLD theories can be 'abstract', not context-adapted, and explanatory in the Duhemian sense.
Physicists do classify NLD theories like the one-dimensional map for the BZ reaction as phenomenological because these theories do not involve models of the detailed (in particular, causal) mechanism of the reaction; just one of the twenty or so chemical species involved is even mentioned in the theory. Such phenomenological theories 'are not based on the chemistry of the BZ reaction. They are instead mathematical constructs designed to reproduce the form of the experimental dynamics' (Gyorgyi and Field [1993] , p. 55). The emphasis is on reproduction of the data but also on the abstractness of the theories: they 'aim at revealing the mathematical essence of the experimental aperiodicity... [they are] of limited use for understanding the chemical mechanism that generates the complexity, (ibid.). Indeed, the map describing the BZ dynamics looks very much like an abstract theory in Cartwright's sense; it is 'not about any particular happenings in any particular circumstances' (Cartwright [1983] , p. 9); it looks much more like the equation associated with a 'block diagram' for the operation of a laser than an equation describing the functioning of a particular realization of a laser (Cartwright [1989] , p. 225). Nevertheless we do not make a model of the system in order to connect the BZ map with the observations. The unsoundness argument which denies the possibility of confirmation for abstract theories is thus not applicable.
NLD theories such as simple maps are phenomenological in the sense that they do not depend on specific models of the systems they are applied to.
8 These theories are, however, not to be classified as phenomenological if we understand the term in the sense of context-adapted descriptions: NLD theories apply to many different kinds of systems and thus serve to classify 8 In late nineteenth-and early twentieth-century physics a theory was labelled 'phenomenological' when it was considered to be independent from uncertain assumptions about the inner workings of a system. A phenomenological theory would remain accurate regardless of the kind of mechanism that may be postulated (or be discovered) for generating the system's behaviour. It didn't matter whether such mechanisms were microscopic and unobservable, i.e. atomistic, or macroscopic and fictious, like the electromagnetic ether models in terms of wheels and rubber bands or hidden gyroscopes. The distinctive quality of phenomenological theories was their epistemological security: they would hold under every future development of our knowledge of the hidden causal mechanisms of a system (cf. e.g. Voigt [1915] ).
these systems into classes. This renders these theories explanatory in Cartwright and Duhem's sense of the term: 9 to explain a set of phenomena is to
give a physical theory of them, 'a physical theory in Duhem's sense, one that summarizes ... and logically classifies them ...' (Cartwright [1983] , p. 96; cf. Duhem [1914] , p. 7). In the parts of physics characterized by the Galilean method phenomena are classified in terms of laws about the behaviour of isolated factors; hence their wide applicability. Newton's second law, talking about what forces do 'in the abstract', summarizes and classifies all special laws of motion like the one for harmonic oscillators, etc. In NLD, as outlined above, a non-Galilean method can be applied and one would expect this different methodology to induce a different way of classifying phenomena. Indeed, we find classifications in terms of structural features of the behaviour of NLD systems, features like 'routes to chaos' or topological characteristics of attractors. The same kind of attractor, the 'Lorenz attractor', can be seen in, say, an experiment studying Rayleigh-Benard convection in a liquid, and in the analyses of the output of a certain type of lasers. Lorenz's famous system of three coupled ordinary differential equations classifies these different systems.
Although originally meant to model only convection phenomena, Lorenz's equations have lost all [the] wetness, all the properties of a fluid except chaos; the same equations could conceivably arise in many situations that have nothing to do with fluid dynamics. The great distance of these equations from fluid dynamics emphasizes the abstract mathematical nature of chaos (Yorke and Yorke [1981] , p. 93).
The theory, in other words, is not context-adapted despite the fact that it is phenomenological in the sense of being applicable without mediation of a further model. In the example of the BZ map we find a similar contrast. The theory is not abstract in Cartwright's sense of representing the behaviour of a factor in isolation. The time series in the BZ experiment is a record of the behaviour of one factor, the Br"-concentration, in the system. In this record is contained, however, information about the dynamics of the whole system through the coupling between the degrees of freedom. The reconstructed ID-map describes the one factor's behaviour under the influence of all the other factors; the map thus does not abstract from the other factors, it is not about what the one factor would do all by itself. Nevertheless, the map is abstract in the sense that it does not explicitly mention all the other factors. With the metaphor from Section 4 we could say that in cases like this, the kind of abstraction Cartwright talks about becomes superfluous because nature conspires such as to make the dynamics simple. Because of this the simple map is applicable to real systems without a mediating model.
Conclusion
It is a widespread phenomenon in NLD that complicated systems can be described using only a few effective degrees of freedom. NLD thus provides an uncontrived counterexample to the methodological claim that explanatory power, simplicity, and confirmability (truth) do not go together, as well as to the associated metaphysical intuition that complex systems cannot be faithfully represented by simple theories. NLD exemplifies a departure from what has often been regarded as the standard methods of physical research. The one-dimensional map for the BZ reaction, for instance, is 'in no way associated with a partition of the total influence into separate causes' (Cartwright [1988], p. 196) . In the context of econometric modelling Cartwright has called such theories 'holistic'; her prediction is that they 'will fail because ... [they are] anti-Galilean, and Galilean methods are all we have ' (ibid., p. 197) . At least for physics, even if we ignore spectacularly puzzling areas like quantum mechanics and general relativity, such pronouncements are premature.
